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Abstract
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad
range of compound phrases utilized in everyday language. While the system-
aticity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favour of
assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in
both cognitive science and philosophy. This article provides a novel probabilis-
tic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations
are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of
the constituent concepts, or not. Rather than adjudicating between different
grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal
methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and non-
compositional semantics. Compositionality is equated with a joint probability
distribution modelling how the constituent concepts in the combination are
interpreted. Marginal selectivity is emphasized as a pivotal probabilistic con-
straint for the application of the Bell/CH and CHSH systems of inequalities
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(referred to collectively as Bell-type). Non-compositionality is then equated
with either a failure of marginal selectivity, or, in the presence of marginal se-
lectivity, with a violation of Bell-type inequalities. In both non-compositional
scenarios, the conceptual combination cannot be modelled using a joint prob-
ability distribution with variables corresponding to the interpretation of the
individual concepts. The framework is demonstrated by applying it to an em-
pirical scenario of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations.
Keywords: conceptual combination, semantic compositionality, quantum
cognition
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1. Introduction
Humans frequently generate novel associates when presented with unfamiliar
conceptual combinations. For example, in free association experiments, subjects
frequently produce the associate “slave” when cued with the compound “pet hu-
man” (Ramm, 2000), but neither “pet” nor “human” will have the same effect
when presented individually (Nelson et al., 2004). Such cases have sometimes
been used to argue that conceptual combinations have a non-compositional se-
mantics, as it is difficult to explain how the novel free associate “slave” can be
recovered from its constituent concepts, however, this is a controversial position;
within cognitive science, the question of how to represent even single concepts
is still being debated.
Different positions have been put forward, including the prototype view, the
exemplar view, and the theory theory view. Murphy (2002) contrasts these
positions, asking which is most supported by the various aspects of cognition
related to conceptual processing, e.g., learning, induction, lexical processing and
conceptual understanding in children. He concludes, somewhat disappointingly,
that “there is no clear, dominant winner”. Moreover, there is a well documented
tension in cognitive science between the compositionality and the prototypical-
ity of concepts, which is difficult to reconcile (Frixione and Lieto, 2012; Fodor,
1998). Arguments in favour of compositionality centre around the systematicity
and productivity of language; there are infinitely many expressions in natural
language and yet our cognitive resources are finite. Compositionality ensures
that this infinity of expressions can be processed because an arbitrary expres-
sion can be understood in terms of its constituent parts. Since compositionality
is what explains systematicity and productivity, Fodor (1998) claims that con-
cepts are, and must be compositional, however, such claims are at odds with
well-known prototypicality effects (Frixione and Lieto, 2012; Fodor, 1998). For
example, consider the conceptual combination PET FISH. A GUPPY is not a
prototypical PET, nor a prototypical FISH, and yet a GUPPY is a very proto-
typical PET FISH (Hampton, 1997). Therefore, it is hard to imagine how the
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prototype of PET FISH can result from some composition of the prototypes of
PET and FISH, which makes the characterization of concepts in prototypical
terms difficult to reconcile with compositionality (Hampton, 1997; Fodor, 1998).
This supports a view put forward by the philosopher Weiskopf (2007) when he
observed that conceptual combinations are “highly recalcitrant to compositional
semantic analysis”, but even this observation has garnered no general support.
Here, we approach the problem of non-compositionality from a novel per-
spective. We shall show that a suite of sophisticated tools have already been
developed for analysing non-compositionality, albeit in another field of science.
These tools can be naturally extended to the analysis of concepts, and provide
theoretically justified grounds for deciding whether a particular conceptual com-
bination can be considered in terms of the semantics of its constituent parts.
Specific cases will be discussed where conceptual combinations can be shown
to be non-compositional using these analytical methods. We begin with a brief
review of conceptual combination as it is currently understood in cognitive sci-
ence.
1.1. Cognitive theories, compositionality and conceptual combination
The principle of compositionality states that the meanings of higher order
expressions such as sentences are determined from a combination of the mean-
ings of their constituent parts (Costello and Keane, 2000; Mitchell and Lapata,
2010). This is a principle underlying many general theories of language, both
natural and artificial, despite the fact there is considerable debate about what
the principle actually specifies (e.g., notions of both strong and weak composi-
tionality appear in the literature Pelletier (1994)). A compositional account of
conceptual combination is closely related to the notion that concepts are atomic
in nature, but this assumption of atomicity is difficult to maintain when the full
variety of possible semantic behaviour is considered.
Perhaps most supportive of the principle are those combinations that have
an intersective semantics, e.g., the meaning of BLACK CAT is the intersection
of black objects and objects that are cats. Here, it is possible to apply a conjunc-
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tion operator between the two predicates referring to the constituent concepts,
i.e., black(x) ∧ cat(x). Such intersective semantics are compositional, as the
semantics of BLACK CAT are determined solely in terms of the semantics of
the constituent concepts BLACK and CAT. It is tempting to assume that most
conceptual combinations can be modelled in this way, however, the study of in-
tersective combinations in cognitive science has revealed that not all conceptual
combinations display such intersective semantics (Hampton, 1997). For exam-
ple, the intersection of ASTRONAUT and PEN in the combination ASTRO-
NAUT PEN is empty, and therefore its semantics are vacuous, despite its being a
conceptual combination that humans can easily comprehend (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000;
Weiskopf, 2007).
A second type of conceptual combination arises when the first concept modi-
fies the head concept, e.g., in CORPORATE LAWYER, CORPORATE modifies
the more general head concept to give a sub-category of LAWYER. Schema-
based theories of conceptual combination (Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski, 1996),
propose that the head concept is a schema-structure made up of various prop-
erty dimensions (e.g., colour, size, shape etc.) and relational dimensions (e.g.,
habitat, functions, behaviours etc.). Several studies have revealed that modifica-
tion can produce emergent properties (e.g., in HELICOPTER BLANKET the
modification of BLANKET by HELICOPTER generates associate properties
such as “water proof”, “camouflage”, and “made of canvas”), a phenomenon
which present theories struggle to account for (Wilkenfeld and Ward, 2001),
such behaviour is sometimes viewed as evidence for non-compositional seman-
tics (Hampton, 1997; Medin and Shoben, 1988).
Despite these tensions underlying the assumption of compositionality, vir-
tually all researchers have at least assumed a weak form of compositionality in
their analysis of human language, where for example, the initial combination
process begins with separate meanings, but is supplemented later by external
contextual information (Wisniewski, 1996; Swinney et al., 2007). For example,
in Wisniewski (1996)’s dual process theory of conceptual combination, a compe-
tition occurs between the processes of relation linking (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING
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as a crossing for zebras), and property mapping (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as
a striped crossing), as the meaning of the compound is decided upon. This
process is affected by the similarity of the constituent concepts, because sim-
ilar concepts share many facets and so are more likely to result in a property
interpretation, whereas dissimilar concepts are more likely to be combined us-
ing a relational process. Thus, ELEPHANT HORSE is more likely to result in
a property interpretation (e.g., a large horse), than ELEPHANT BOX, which
is more likely to result in a relational interpretation (e.g., a box for holding
elephants). This is because similar concepts share many dimensions (e.g. four
legs, similar shape etc. in the case of elephant and horse) and thus are easier
to combine by mapping one property to another. However, it is important to
note that these processes are all weakly compositional, in the sense that they
rely almost exclusively on the properties of the individual concepts. It is only
later that background knowledge is drawn upon to infer the possible emergent
properties of the new concept. We see people making assumptions that an
ELEPHANT BOX is likely to be made of a strong material such as wood, and
hopefully to contain air-holes. Swinney et al. (2007) found evidence for this
form of weak compositionality in conceptual combination, when they showed
that for adjectival combinations such as BOILED CELERY the properties of
the individual words such as “green” are activated before emergent properties
such as “soft”. However, for the combination APARTMENT DOG, apartment
modifies the “habitat” dimension of dog rather than its “size” (a dog the size
of an apartment), which in turn shows that background knowledge also plays a
role in early combinatory processes such as slot selection (Murphy, 1988).
Rather than entering this long running debate about the proper dividing
line between weak and strong compositionality, it is our intention to provide a
formal framework to analyse the (non-)compositionality of conceptual combi-
nations, motivated by the analysis of composite systems in quantum physics.
Importantly, this framework can be empirically tested. Thus, we feel that it is
possible to shift the above largely theoretical debate onto a more experimental
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footing,1 and this article is a step in that direction. In what follows we shall
discuss the combination of concepts within a tiered model of cognition. This
will provide a framework from which a (non-)compositional semantics can be
developed in further sections.
2. Probabilistic approaches to modeling conceptual combinations
It is at the symbolic level of cognition where a significant portion of the work
on compositional semantics can be placed, because this is where higher order
symbolic structures and associated rules, such as grammar, are processed. A
grammar specifies the parts of a sentence, and the manner in which they fit
together. It makes sense that the semantics attributed to these primitive parts
be intuitive, for example, a noun may be mapped to a set of entities. However,
Zadrozny (1992) has suggested that it doesn’t actually matter which compo-
nents are chosen as primitive, a function can be found that will always produce
a compositional semantics. In Zadrozny’s own words, “..compositionality, as
commonly defined, is not a strong [enough] constraint on a semantic theory”.
The consequence of this with respect to the compositional semantics of natu-
ral language, and hence conceptual combination, is that meaning need not be
assigned to individual words, “we can do equally well by assigning meaning to
phonemes or even LETTERS. . . ” (Zadrozny, 1992). This raises the question
about how to appropriately define the semantics of the language constructs be-
ing composed. It turns out that this is not a straightforward question to answer.
In a well cited and detailed chapter about lexical semantics and compositional-
ity, Partee (1995) highlights that at the outset there are disagreements about
whether semantics can best be viewed from the point of view mathematics or
psychology, a debate that is yet to reach a resolution. For the purposes of
this article we chose to approach the problem of how to semantically represent
1In much the same way as the field of physics entered the realms of experimental test-
ing with the work of Bell and Aspect, after decades of more philosophical debate as to the
separability and completeness of the quantum formalism (Isham, 1995; Laloe¨, 2001).
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Associate Probability
ball 0.25
cave 0.13
vampire 0.07
fly 0.06
night 0.06
baseball 0.05
bird 0.04
blind 0.04
animal 0.02
· · · · · ·
Associate Probability
fighter 0.14
gloves 0.14
fight 0.09
dog 0.08
shorts 0.07
punch 0.05
Tyson 0.05
· · · · · ·
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Free association probabilities for the word “bat” (a) and the word “boxer” (b).
concepts from the point of view of psychology, using free association norms to
ground our models.
Consider the concept BAT. One reliable way to seek an understanding of
this concept is via free association experiments where subjects are cued with
the word “bat” and asked to produce the first word that comes to mind (Nelson
et al., 2013). Over large numbers of subjects, probabilities can be calculated that
a certain associate is produced. Fig. 1(a) depicts a subset of data taken from
the University of South Florida word association norms (USF-norms) (Nelson
et al., 2004). Upon examination of this table, we can see that these probabilities
represent two clear senses for the cue “bat”; a SPORT sense (with relevant
associates in bold) and an ANIMAL sense. Considering the full dataset2 allows
us to generate the total probability ps of recall for the sport sense by summing
the probabilities of the relevant associates: ps = 0.25 + 0.05 = 0.30. The rest of
the associates all happen to be relevant to the animal sense of bat, so pa = 0.70.
The same can be said for the concept BOXER (see Fig. 1(b) where, once again,
the associates relevant to the sport sense of BOXER are in bold).
Having constructed a model of the individual concepts, we might ask how
the conceptual combination BOXER BAT will be interpreted by a subject. Four
2Available at http://web.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/AppendixC/Matrices.A-B .
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interpretations are possible within this scenario. For example, when BOXER is
interpreted as a sport and BAT as an animal, the corresponding interpretation
of the combination might be something along the lines of a “furry black animal
with boxing gloves on”, or perhaps BOXER could be interpreted as a sport and
BAT as as a sport leading a subject to interpret the compound as “a fighter’s
implement”.
Conceptual combinations usually have more than one possible interpreta-
tion. This may arise from a range of factors, including the meaning of the
concepts themselves (e.g. BOXER can be interpreted as a dog, a sportsperson,
a pair of shorts, someone who puts things in boxes, etc.), the sentence in which
they appear, the background of the subject etc.. Different human subjects will
often interpret the same conceptual combination differently, indeed, the same
human subject, if placed in a new context may very well provide a different in-
terpretation for the same concept. Thus, it is sensible to approach the analysis
of compositionality probabilistically.
In what follows each concept is assumed to have a dominant sense and one
or more subordinate senses. The distinction between the two can be inferred
from free association norms such as those discussed above. For example, the
dominance of the sport sense of BOXER is clearly evident in Fig. 1(a), where
the probability associated with the sport sense is greater than the animal sense,
which leads us to designate the sport sense as “dominant” and the animal sense
as “subordinate”. It should be noted, however, that the distinction between
“dominant” and “subordinate” senses is not necessary for the theory presented
below, rather it is an explanatory aid.
Standard probabilistic reasoning suggests that if two ambiguous concepts A
and B have behaviour that can be considered as compositional, then it should
be possible to describe this behaviour in terms of sets of dichotomous random
variables. In the dominant/subordinate scenario introduced above this would
lead to four random variables {A1,A2} and {B1,B2}, ranging over two values
{+1,−1}, where we have used the numbers 1 (dominant) and 2 (subordinate)
to refer to the senses that are used to prime to their respective concepts A and
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B in an experiment.
Now, if a human subject is first primed with the word “vampire” and sub-
sequently asked to interpret the compound BOXER BAT, then they may be
oriented towards giving an animal interpretation of the concept BAT (which
could in turn influence their interpretation of BOXER). This suggests a min-
imal natural extension of the model where A1 = +1 represents a situation
where the subject was first primed with a word representing the dominant sense
of concept A (e.g. for BAT this could be “vampire”) and concept A was indeed
subsequently interpreted in this dominant sense by a human subject when they
are asked to give an interpretation for a conceptual combination. Conversely,
A1 = −1 represents the case where the subject was primed with the dominant
sense of concept A but A was not subsequently interpreted in that sense. Sim-
ilarly, A2 = ±1 represents a situation where a subordinate sense of concept A
was primed, and concept A was (+1) or was not (−1) interpreted in this sense.
Note that a concept may have more than one subordinate sense. For example,
the concept BOXER could be considered to have an extra subordinate sense
indicative of clothing, namely “boxer shorts”. This point can be incorporated
into the above formalism based on a primary and subordinate senses by allow-
ing that the concept A can be interpreted in a third (or more) senses. Thus,
A1 = −1, can occur because the concept primed by A1 is interpreted in the
subordinate sense (as above), or in a third sense not directly primed by the
experimental arrangement.
Priming thus allows for the experimental control of the contextual cues in-
fluencing conceptual combinations. This is important because conceptual com-
binations always appear in a context (e.g., a discourse context), which affects
how they will ultimately be interpreted. Fig. 2 gives a general representation
of the reasoning used in the construction of the above probabilistic scenario. A
‘black box’ is depicted, with two proposed components, A and B, inside it. Two
different experiments can be carried out upon each of the two presumed com-
ponents, which will answer a set of ‘questions’ with binary outcomes, leading to
four experimental scenarios. For example, one experimental scenario would be
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B2
B1
1+
1_={
1+
1_={
A2
A11+1_ }=
1+
1_
BA}=
Figure 2: A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed components A
and B. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive choice of experiments
performed upon those components, one represented by the random variables A1,A2 (pertain-
ing to an interaction between the experimenter and component A), and the other by B1,B2
(pertaining to an interaction between the experimenter and component B). Each of these
experiments can return a value of +1 or -1.
to ask whether subjects return an interpretation of the concept A that corre-
sponds to the prime A1 and similarly for B in relation to the prime B2. What
analysis can be brought to bear upon such a situation?
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments will have a statis-
tical distribution over all available outcomes. In what follows, we shall aim to
develop a general mathematical apparatus that can be used to discover whether
the presumed sub-components can be considered as isolated, influencing one
another, or in some sense irreducible. We shall do this through a considera-
tion of the joint probability distribution of the variables A1,A2,B1, and B2,
PrA1,A2,B1,B2, which can be used to model the behaviour of the experimental
black box. While this analysis will be performed using conceptual combina-
tions, we emphasize that this black box is potentially very general and that the
analysis developed here can be applied to far more than the analysis of language.
We start by noting that if priming two concepts A and B using two senses
of each concept, then we can construct 16 joint probabilities, corresponding to
all the possible interpretations that a subject might return, across four possible
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priming conditions corresponding to two senses for each concept:
p1 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = +1) p2 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = −1)
p3 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = +1) p4 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = −1)
p5 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = +1) p6 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = −1)
p7 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B2 = +1) p8 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B2 = +1)
p9 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B1 = +1) p10 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B1 = −1)
p11 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B1 = +1) p12 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B1 = −1)
p13 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B2 = +1) p14 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B2 = −1)
p15 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B2 = +1) p16 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B2 = −1). (1)
These sixteen probabilities can be set out in an array as follows:
A
A1
+1
−1
A2
+1
−1
B
B1
+1 −1
B2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16

(2)
This matrix lists the different priming conditions in a set of four blocks, which
allows us to consider the structure of the probabilities describing the likely
interpretation of a given conceptual combination. Observe how the matrix is
complete, in that it covers all possible priming conditions across the two concepts
for this scenario.
In what follows we will show how this matrix can be used to determine
whether a conceptual combination is compositional, or not. We start by con-
sidering what might be required in order for a conceptual combination to be
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deemed compositional.
2.1. Compositional semantics
Were the semantics of the conceptual combination AB to be compositional,
how would this be reflected in its probabilistic structure? The principle of
semantic compositionality would suggest that the joint probability distribution
could be recovered from the probability distributions constructed using each
individual concept.
Thus, we shall take a given conceptual combination AB to be composi-
tional if and only if a four way joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 exists where
PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈ {1, 2} are marginal distributions. This opens the door to define
non-compositionality via an unusual means, namely the inability to construct a
joint probability distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 in this way.
2.2. Non-compositional semantics
To analyse non-compositionality we draw upon results from the field of quan-
tum theory surrounding entangled systems (see e.g. Laloe¨ (2001) for a compre-
hensive review of the quantum formalism). This step is not as arbitrary as it
might at first seem. An entangled system is one for which is it is not always pos-
sible to construct a four way joint distribution from four empirically collected
pairwise joint distributions. Of particular interest for the current argument,
Fine’s theorem (Fine, 1982) states the necessary and sufficient conditions for
existence of a joint probability distribution, and hence the notion of composi-
tionality introduced at the end of the previous section.
Fine Theorem 3 (Fine, 1982): If A1,A2,B1,B2 are bivalent random
variables with joint distributions PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then necessary and suf-
ficient for a joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 is that the following system of
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inequalities is satisfied:
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B1) + Pr(A1, B2) + Pr(A2, B2)− Pr(A2, B1)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0
(3)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B1) + Pr(A2, B2) + Pr(A1, B2)− Pr(A1, B1)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0
(4)
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B2) + Pr(A1, B1) + Pr(A2, B1)− Pr(A2, B2)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0
(5)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B2) + Pr(A2, B1) + Pr(A1, B1)− Pr(A1, B2)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0,
(6)
where Pr(Ai,Bj) is shorthand for Pr(Ai = +1,Bj = +1), Pr(Ai) for Pr(Ai =
+1) and Pr(Bj) represents Pr(Bj = +1), i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Fine referred to this system of inequalities as the Bell/CH inequalities, but
they hark back to the separability assumption made in Bell’s original theorem
Bell (1964) and we will refer to this class of inequalities as Bell-type inequalities.
Fine’s theorem permits us to analyse compositionality from a formal perspective
that is open to experimentation. According to this approach, a conceptual
combination AB is deemed “non-compositional” when the four pair wise joint
probability distributions in (2) do not satisfy the Bell-type inequalities provided
by Fine’s theorem. This scenario implies that a joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2
cannot be formed such that the four pairwise joint probability distributions
PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈ {1, 2} are marginal distributions. Conversely, if all inequalities
are satisfied then the four way joint probability distribution does exist, and the
conceptual combination can be deemed “compositional” in the measurement
context.
Physical systems adhere to a constraint variously termed “the causal com-
munication constraint”, “parameter independence”, “simple locality”, “signal
locality”, or “physical locality” (Maudlin, 1994). This is due to the constric-
tions of a theory independent from quantum theory; Special Relativity. All
physical systems that are spatially separated should behave in such a way that
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“the probability of a particular measurement outcome on any one part of the
system should be independent of which sort of measurement was performed on
the other parts” (Cereceda, 2000). Such conditions are termed “marginal selec-
tivity” (Dzhafarov and Kujala, 2012) in cognitive systems, and it is necessary
for a system to satisfy them before it can be considered surprising that this sys-
tem does not satisfy the Bell-type inequalities. Thus, we must have a reason to
believe that a system should be considered separable before we can be shocked
to find that it is not. For example, with respect to the conceptual combination
BOXER BAT, marginal selectivity entails the interpretation of BAT does not
change when the primes of BOXER are varied from “fighter” to “dog”. This
is a first indication that the two concepts could perhaps be modelled composi-
tionally.
Marginal selectivity is expressed more formally as follows:
Pr(Ai = +1) = Pr(Ai = +1,B1 = +1) + Pr(Ai = +1,B1 = −1)
= Pr(Ai = +1,B2 = +1) + Pr(Ai = +1,B2 = −1), i ∈ {1, 2}
(7)
Pr(Bj = +1) = Pr(A1 = +1,Bj = +1) + Pr(A1 = −1,Bj = +1)
= Pr(A2 = +1,Bj = +1) + Pr(A2 = −1,Bj = +1), j ∈ {1, 2}
(8)
Note how these four equations express that the interpretation of the concept
represented by the marginal probability is stable with respect to how the other
concept is primed (e.g., Pr(Ai = +1) is stable with respect to the different
primings of concept B as represented by B1 and B2).
Recently, Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have established a connection be-
tween Fine’s theorem and the theory of selective influences in psychology, a
result that suggests that Fine’s theorem can be usefully applied to cognitive
models. In a model with several factors and a set of random variables describ-
ing responses, selective influence concerns the problem of what factors influence
what variables. The interpretation of conceptual combinations within a prim-
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ing scenario can be treated with a model of selective influence, with primes
corresponding to the factors affecting random variable corresponding to the
interpretation of concepts. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) point out that selec-
tive influence implies marginal selectivity. Failure of marginal selectivity means
there can be no model of selective influence, meaning there is no joint probability
distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 where the pairwise distributions PrA1,B1, PrA1,B2,
PrA2,B1, PrA2,B2 are marginal distributions.
The proof of Fine’s theorem assumes locality, which is the physical equiva-
lent of marginal selectivity for spatially separated physical systems (including
the entangled systems of photons that occur in quantum physics). In cognitive
science, however, concepts are not as well behaved as photons, so marginal se-
lectivity may or may not hold. This is a crucial point. There has been some
confusion about what characteristics a cognitive system should have before it
can be modelled using Bell type inequalities. For example, Aerts et al. (2013)
present an experiment to establish whether the concepts ANIMAL and ACTS
are “entangled” in the expression “The Animal Acts”. Placed within the frame-
work presented in this paper, the goal of the experiment was to determine
whether the conceptual combination ANIMAL ACTS is compositional, or not.
The authors employed the CHSH inequality and achieve a violation, and so
claim that the combination is “entangled”, i.e., non-compositional. However, a
subsequent analysis of the experiment showed that marginal selectivity does not
hold (Dzhafarov and Kujala, 2014b), which means that the non-compositionality
is in a certain sense trivial (the system should never have been modelled using
compositional methods to start with).
For applications in cognitive science, marginal selectivity must be tested
first, before any Bell-type inequality can be appropriately applied:
1. If marginal selectivity fails, then the conceptual combination is immedi-
ately judged as “non-compositional”.
2. If marginal selectivity holds and any of the Bell-type inequalities are vio-
lated, then the conceptual combination is deemed “non-compositional”.
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3. If marginal selectivity holds and all of the Bell-type inequalities hold, then
the conceptual combination is deemed “compositional”.
Quantum physics has explored a number of equivalent formulations of the lo-
cality condition that is termed marginal selectivity in psychology (including the:
Bell; Clauser Horne (CH); and Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) forms
(Laloe¨, 2001)). Of particular interest to the present argument, the CHSH in-
equality provides a formulation based on correlations between systems A and
B, and so permits some insight to be gained into why conceptual combina-
tions might be noncompositional even if they satisfy marginal selectivity in an
experiment.
The CHSH inequality deals with expectation values rather than probabilities,
and can be written as (Laloe¨, 2001; Cereceda, 2000):
−2 ≤ E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1)− E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (9)
where E(Ai,Bj) i, j ∈ {1, 2} is a correlation function corresponding to the
expectation value of a measurement of the experimental scenario depicted in
figure 2.3 Expectation values can be computed from the matrix of probabilities
(2), e.g., E(A1,B1) = p1 + p4 − (p2 + p3). Recalling from (1) that p1 =
Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = +1) and p4 = Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = −1), we recognise that p1
corresponds to a situation where concepts A and B have both been interpreted
in their dominant sense, when in both cases the dominant sense of each concept
has been primed. Similarly, p4 corresponds to both A and B being interpreted in
a subordinate sense when the dominant sense of each concept has been primed.
Thus, p1+p4 = 1 occurs when the senses of the constituent concepts are perfectly
correlated within the given priming condition.
For example, assuming that the fruit sense of the concept APPLE was
3We note that the expectation values used in these equations consider products. Thus
Suppes et al. (1998) write E[AiBj]. However, as the CHSH inequality is most commonly
written in the E(Ai,Bj) form we have kept this notation throughout this paper to minimise
confusion.
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primed, along with the food sense of CHIP. Perfect correlation of senses in
this priming condition means that two conditions hold: (1) when APPLE is
interpreted as a fruit CHIP is always interpreted as food (p1) and, (2) when
APPLE is not interpreted as fruit, CHIP is not interpreted as food (p4). The
combination of these two conditions imply that p1 + p4 = 1 and p2 + p3 = 0.
Conversely, p2 + p3 = 1 occurs when the senses are perfectly anti-correlated.
If we assume the fruit sense of APPLE is primed and CHIP is primed in its
electronic circuit sense then perfect anti-correlation of senses means two new
conditions hold: (3) When APPLE is not interpreted as a fruit, CHIP is always
interpreted as a circuit (p3), and (4) when APPLE is interpreted as fruit, CHIP
is not interpreted in its circuit sense (p2).
The expectation value E(Ai,Bj) computes the degree to which the senses of
the constituent concepts are (anti-)correlating. The arrangement of probabilities
in figure (2) is not significant. There are thus four possible ways to arrange the
quadrants, with each arrangement leading to a variant of the CHSH inequality:
−2 ≤ E(A1,B1)− E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (10)
−2 ≤ E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2)− E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (11)
−2 ≤ −E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (12)
Therefore, there are four CHSH inequalities in total (9–12), each differing in
where the minus sign is placed. The heart of each inequality is a computation
involving correlations which will be referred to as the CHSH value. When the
CHSH value of any of the inequalities lies outside of the range [-2, 2], meaning its
absolute value is greater than 2, then there is no joint probability distribution
PrA1,A2,B1,B2 such that the four empirically collected pairwise distributions
PrA1,B1,PrA1,B2,PrA2,B1,PrA2,B2 are marginal distributions. In such a case,
the associated conceptual combination is deemed “non-compositional”.
Conversely, when the CHSH value lies within [-2,2] for all four inequalities,
there is a joint probability distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 where the four empir-
ically collected pairwise distributions: PrA1,B1,PrA1,B2,PrA2,B1,PrA2,B2 are
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marginal distributions. In this case, the conceptual combination is deemed
“compositional”.
When marginal selectivity holds, the CHSH inequalities and Bell/CH in-
equalities are algebraically equivalent. However, as the CHSH inequalities are
based on correlations, they offer a means to explain non-compositionality in
terms of correlations between senses. As was the case with Fine/CH inequali-
ties, marginal selectivity must first be tested before the four CHSH inequalities
can be applied. Thus, in QT we have found a probabilistic formalism that allows
for the assumption of compositionality to be tested. If a system of probabilistic
relationships can be constructed for a cognitive scenario (or any other scenario
that matches the structure depicted in Fig. 2) then we can test whether it should
be deemed compositional. Non-compositionality would then be determined by
the inability to construct a joint probability distributions across the four vari-
ables modelling how the primary and a subordinate sense of the concepts A
and B are interpreted. We now illustrate how these probabilistic methods for
analysing compositionality can be deployed in an experimental setting.
3. Empirical Illustration
3.1. Subjects
Sixty-five subjects were recruited from the undergraduate psychology pool
at Griffith University and received credit for their participation. Only native
English speakers were selected in order remove the possibility that the interpre-
tation of conceptual combinations would be confounded by language issues.
3.2. Design and materials
We utilised four different priming regimes in order to generate the four differ-
ent experimental scenarios suggested by Fig. 2. In these experiments, subjects
were first primed and then presented with a non-lexicalised conceptual combi-
nation which they were asked to interpret, also designating the senses that were
used in that interpretation (see Fig. 3). A probabilistic analysis was then per-
formed upon the data so obtained. Subjects were presented with twenty-four
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‘true’ conceptual combinations (see below for an explanation), and so partici-
pated in twenty-four test trials. Table 2 lists the set of conceptual combinations
used, as well as the corresponding primes.
Primes were selected from the USF free association norms (Nelson et al.,
2004) and the University of Alberta norms of homographs (Twilley et al., 1994).
The majority of primes were selected from the USF norms. The procedure for
selecting primes from these norms was to view a potential prime as a cue which
produces the required concept as an associate with a high probability. As an
example, “money” was chosen from the USF norms to prime the financial sense
of BANK as “bank” is produced as a free associate of the cue “money” with high
probability. Similarly, “river” was chosen to prime the natural sense of BANK.
Occasionally when a particular sense was not present in the USF norms, we drew
upon the University of Alberta norms. Importantly, the USF norms were used to
avoid cues such as “account” which are associated with both BANK and LOG,
thereby minimising the possibility of priming more than one concept at a time.
Specific conceptual combinations were chosen with the expectation that the
ambiguity of constituents would allow a number of alternative interpretations,
where each interpretation arose from a different attribution of meaning to the
underlying sense of the ambiguous concepts (Costello and Keane, 1997).
A single factor design was used, which analysed responses to non-lexicalised
conceptual combinations under priming conditions that varied between subjects.
A subject was assigned to one of four priming conditions for each presented
conceptual combination. For example, the four priming conditions for BANK
LOG are (1) “money” and “journal” (A1−B1), (2) “money” and “tree” (A1−
B2), (3) “river” and “journal” (A2−B1), or (4) “river” and “tree” (A2−B2).
This assignment of primes was based upon a between groups Latin square design,
such that for the 24 combinations, each participant completed each priming
condition 6 times.
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Figure 3: Example experimental structure for a trial. Non-word trials followed a similar
structure, with primes in Phase 1 and/or Phase 2 replaced with non-words. The sequence of
squares moving from left to right show the experimental flow, with each square a representation
of the screen shown to a participant. Note: the figure does not show the exact text given to
participants, and stimuli are not to scale.
3.3. Procedure
Fig. 3 shows a schematic illustration of the procedure followed during a
test trial. Participants completed 3 practice trials, 24 test trials and 24 filler
trials. All trials were composed of six phases, consisting of three initial time-
pressured tasks followed by three non-timed tasks. The time limitation of the
first three phases was introduced with the expectation that this would maximise
the effectiveness of the priming. The experiment took around 20–30 minutes to
complete, and participants pushed the ENTER key to begin each trial.
Phases 1-2:
Two consecutive double lexical decision tasks were carried out, where partici-
pants were asked to decide as quickly as possible whether two letter strings, a
prime and the concept to be presented as a part of the compound given in Phase
3, were legitimate words, or if one of the strings was a non-word. Each lexical
decision consisted of the the two letter strings presented in the centre of screen,
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one below the other in order to discourage participants from interpreting the
two words as a phrase. Participants responded to the decision tasks by pushing
a button on the keyboard, labelled ‘word’ or a button labelled ‘non-word’ (left
arrow and right arrow keys respectively). For instance, if given the strings “coil”
and “spring”, then participants were expected to decide that both strings were
words and so push the ‘word’ key, whereas if given “grod” and “church” then
participants were expected to decide that they had been shown a non-word and
to push the ‘non-word’ key. For all of the test trials participants received two
phases of word-word strings. The response ratio for the two priming phases
were: 50% word → word (test trial), 25% non-word → non-word (filler trial),
12.5% word → non-word (filler trial), 12.5% non-word → word (filler trial). In
phases where a non-word was present, it appeared equally often in the top or
the bottom portion of the screen.
The double-lexical decision task was used to associate the priming word
and test word together without participants interpreting them as a compound
(Gagne, 2001). This procedure isolates the experimental priming to each con-
cept in the combination. For example, the lexical decision task applied to “coil”
and “spring” was designed to prime the coil sense of the concept SPRING in the
conceptual combination SPRING PLANT. The order of the two double lexical
decision tasks was counter-balanced, so that half were presented in the same
order as the compound words (e.g., “coil” and “spring” were first presented,
then “factory” and “plant”) and half were presented in the reverse order (e.g.,
first “factory” and “plant” were presented for lexical decision, followed by “coil”
and “spring”).
Phase 3:
A conceptual combination was presented in the centre of the screen (e.g., “spring
plant”). Participants were asked to push the space bar as soon as they thought
of an interpretation for the compound. Filler compounds were included for the
filler (i.e., non-word) trials so as not to disrupt the participant’s rhythm in mak-
ing two lexical decisions followed by an interpretation.
Phase 4:
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Participants were asked to type in a description of their interpretation.
Phases 5-6:
Two disambiguation tasks were carried out, where participants chose what sense
they gave to each word from a list (e.g., plant = A. ‘a living thing’; B. ‘a factory’;
C. ‘other’).
3.4. Results
Experimental subcomponents utilizing non-words were discarded during the
analysis. In total, 91.5% of the interpretations provided by the subjects fell
within one of the four primed senses of the studied conceptual combinations.
As stated previously, in order to apply Bell-type inequalities for composi-
tional analysis, marginal selectivity must first be tested. Table 1 depicts an
analysis of marginal selectivity where the values in the columns depict the dif-
ference of marginal probabilities across the conditions of the associated variable,
as well as the confidence intervals. For example, diff(A1) is the difference be-
tween the one-marginal Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = +1) + Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = −1) and
the second one-marginal Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = +1) + Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = −1).
Marginal selectivity holds when these differences are zero across all four vari-
ables. The breadth of the confidence intervals and the fact that many are not
centred around zero does not allow us to conclude with confidence that any of
these conceptual combinations satisfy marginal selectivity, although BATTERY
CHARGE, BILL SCALE and TOAST GAG could possibly be adhering to this
condition as the differences in marginal probabilities are low, and their confi-
dence intervals are overlap 0 for all values of diff. However, the sample size is
small (see Table 2) and so we cannot be confident that this condition is satis-
fied. However, for the purposes of illustration, we will assume in the analysis to
follow that these three combinations do satisfy marginal selectivity.
The result of the compositional analysis is depicted in Table 2. We have
tentatively flagged combinations as “non-compositional” if they appear likely
to fail marginal selectivity given the current dataset. Of the combinations that
are assumed to satisfy marginal selectivity, BILL SCALE (|CHSH| = 1.63) and
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Combination diff (A1) diff (A2) diff (B1) diff (B2)
boxer bat 0.175 [-0.19,0.30] 0.140 [-0.32,0.50] 0.338 [-0.04,0.71] 0.158 [0.25,0.57]
bank log 0.055 [-0.22,0.32] 0.092 [-0.27,0.42] 0.338 [0,0.67] 0.257 [-0.08,0.60]
apple chip 0.250 [-0.02,0.52] 0.114 [-0.28,-0.51] 0.294 [-0.01,0.61] 0.217 [-0.17,0.61]
stock tick 0.163 [-0.24,0.57] 0.085 [-0.30,0.48] 0.488 [0.11,0.85] 0.386 [0.02,0.74]
seal pack 0.083 [-0.30,0.47] 0.213 [-0.10,0.37] 0.162 [-0.21,0.53] 0.221 [-0.18,0.63]
spring plant 0.294 [0.01,0.57] 0.133 [-0.13,0.41] 0 [0,0] 0.173 [-0.12,0.46]
poker spade 0.136 [-0.21,0.48] 0.035 [-0.28,0.35] 0 [-0.29,0.29] 0.113 [-0.26,0.48]
slug duck 0.096 [-0.31,0.52] 0.153 [-0.21,0.52] 0.133 [ -0.22,0.48] 0.026 [-0.34,0.38]
club bar 0.133 [-0.10,0.37] 0 [-0.23,0.23] 0.125 [-0.10,0.35] 0.138 [-0.16,0.44]
web bug 0.210 [-0.18,0.60] 0.067 [-0.30,0.44] 0.296 [-0.10,0.69] 0.153 [-0.21,0.52]
table file 0.058 [-0.21,0.32] 0.235 [-0.27,0.32] 0.114 [-0.25,0.40] 0.113 [-0.26,0.48]
match bowl 0.137 [-0.26,0.54] 0.250 [-0.12,0.62] 0.075 [-0.23,0.38] 0.022 [-0.33,0.37]
net cap 0.035 [-0.29,0.36] 0.092 [-0.31,0.49] 0.059 [-0.30,0.51] 0.175 [-0.34,0.43]
stag yarn 0.375 [0.02,0.73] 0.219 [-0.12,0.56] 0.104 [-0.26,0.43] 0.045 [-0.30,0.39]
mole pen 0.125 [-0.16,0.41] 0.021 [-0.33,0.37] 0.063 [-0.34,0.46] 0.3 [-0.08,0.68]
battery charge* 0.067 [-0.21,0.35] 0.048 [-0.28,0.37] 0.117 [-0.22,0.45] 0.120 [-0.23,0.43]
count watch 0.195 [-0.14,0.53] 0.063 [-0.25,0.38] 0.011 [-0.26,0.28] 0.063 [-0.29,0.41]
bill scale* 0.081 [-0.30,0.46] 0.113 [-0.26,0.48] 0.054 [-0.26,0.37] 0.051 [-0.24,0.34]
rock strike 0.188 [-0.07,0.44] 0.117 [-0.22,0.45] 0.313 [0.02,0.60] 0.013 [-0.28,0.30]
port vessel 0.106 [-0.29,0.50] 0.085 [-0.31,0.48] 0.113 [-0.26,0.48] 0.118 [-0.19,0.43]
crane hatch 0.141 [-0.15,0.44] 0.296 [-0.10,0.69] 0.149 [-0.18,0.48] 0.233 [-0.16,0.63]
toast gag* 0.0625 [-0.12,0.24] 0.008 [-0.32,0.34] 0.018 [-0.35,0.38] 0.015 [-0.34,0.38]
star suit 0.308 [-0.02,0.64] 0.163 [-0.25,0.48] 0.054 [-0.26,0.37] 0.058 [-0.20,-0.32]
fan post 0.35 [-0.04,0.74] 0.125 [-0.28,0.53] 0.025 [-0.34,0.39] 0.188 [-0.20,0.57]
Table 1: Analysis of marginal selectivity. Values represent differences of marginal probabil-
ities with associated 95% confidence interval (obtained using a 2-sample test for equality of
proportions with continuity correction). BATTERY CHARGE, BILL SCALE and TOAST
GAG are starred (*) as they are assumed to satisfy marginal selectivity.
TOAST GAG (|CHSH| = 1.63) are deemed “compositional” as their CHSH
values are less than or equal to 2. BATTERY CHARGE shows a slight vio-
lation of the CHSH inequalities (|CHSH| = 2.01), so could be deemed “non-
compositional”, but due to the lack of confidence in whether marginal selectivity
is holding, we cannot make any firm conclusions. More experiments will be re-
quired.
3.5. Discussion
In this discussion we provide further details with the aim of shedding light on
how the joint probability distribution is structured and what this might mean
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when a violation of compositionality occurs. We shall utilise two examples:
TOAST GAG and APPLE CHIP.
TOAST GAG
Matrix (13) depicts the the empirical results for TOAST GAG. Here, we see
no particular ordering or patterns. In particular, when we compare the form of
the equation required for a violation of equations (9–12) and the actual values
in matrix (13) we can see that the probability mass does not centre sufficiently
around the diagonals in such a way that it can produce the correlations between
the senses necessary to violate the CHSH inequality as |CHSH| = 1.23 ≤ 2.
The conceptual combination TOAST GAG is therefore deemed to be “compo-
sitional” as a joint probability distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 can be constructed,
which models how it is interpreted within the given priming conditions.
T
O
A
S
T
A1(jam)
+1
−1
A2(speech)
+1
−1
GAG
B2(choke)
+1 −1
B1(joke)
+1 −1
0.50 0.4375
0.0625 0
0.625 0.375
0 0
0.29 0
0.29 0.42
0.07 0.21
0.57 0.14

(13)
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APPLE CHIP
In contrast, APPLE CHIP leads to a joint distribution that has a more
interesting structure:
A
P
P
L
E
A1(banana)
+1
−1
A2(computer)
+1
−1
CHIP
B1(potato)
+1 −1
B2(circuit)
+1 −1
0.94 0.06
0 0
0 0.75
0.25 0
0 0.35
0.65 0
0.47 0
0 0.53

(14)
It is clear from the values in Table 1 that APPLE CHIP fails marginal se-
lectivity. Therefore the joint probability distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 cannot be
constructed from the four empirically collected pairwise joint probability distri-
butions such that these four pairwise distributions depicted in matrix (14) can
be recovered by marginalising this four way joint distribution. This conceptual
combination is therefore deemed “non-compositional”.
However, we claim that the status of this conceptual combination as non-
compositional is likely to be more interesting than a simple failure of marginal
selectivity. APPLE CHIP shows a strong pattern of correlation between the
senses across the four priming conditions because the probabilities are concen-
trated on the diagonals or reverse diagonals. Thus, whenever a subject interprets
APPLE as a fruit they tend to interpret CHIP in its FOOD sense. Conversely,
if APPLE is interpreted as a ‘computer’ then a CHIP is interpreted as an ‘elec-
tronic device’. This structure was quite common in the conceptual combinations
that were studied. A second key factor is that a non-zero value has been returned
by the ensemble of subjects for one off-diagonal case p2 = Pr(A1, B1) = 0.06
(see Matrix (2)). Even though the food sense of CHIP has been primed, atypi-
cal interpretations of the compound are produced, for example, “apple’s growth
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is controlled by an internal chip”. Costello and Keane (2000) identify three
categories of non-compositionality in novel conceptual combinations, and atyp-
ical instances are at the basis of one of these categories. Some other non-
compositional conceptual combinations showed similar atypical interpretations.
For example, BANK LOG also exhibits a strong correlation between the senses:
When BANK is interpreted as a financial institution, LOG tends to be inter-
preted as a “record”. Conversely, when BANK is interpreted in it’s “river”
sense, LOG is interpreted as a “piece of wood”. However, there were atypical
cases where the senses cross over which produces an off-diagonal probability
e.g., “a record of a bank of a river”.
We hypothesise that one way for a conceptual combination to satisfy marginal
selectivity and yet be deemed non-compositional involves a particular structure,
which is demonstrated by the example depicted in matrix (15). Here we see the
probability mass is largely concentrated along diagonals, because typical in-
terpretations can often occur when senses are (anti-)correlating. For example,
when APPLE is interpreted as fruit, CHIP is interpreted as food. The small off-
diagonal probabilities reflect the atypical interpretations of Costello and Keane
(2000), which may signify non-compositionality. Assuming each of quadrants
in Matrix (15) is based on 100 data points, then diff(A1) = 0.02 and the
95% confidence interval is [-0.07,0.11]. Similarly, diff(A2) = 0.01[−0.06, 0.8],
diff(B1) = 0.01[−0.10, 0.12] and diff(B2) = 0.01[−0.07, 0.09]. These figures
demonstrate what the statistics should look like when marginal selectivity is
holding, i.e., the differences in marginal probabilities are very small and the con-
fidence intervals are tightly centred around zero. In additition, the probabilities
in matrix (15) yield an absolute CHSH value of 2.06. The atypical interpreta-
tions, highlighted by the bolded probabilities, are what force the CHSH value
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to exceed the threshold of two, and thus into non-compositionality.
A
A1 (prime a1)
+1
−1
A2 (prime a2)
+1
−1
B
B1 (prime b1)
+1 −1
B2 (prime b2)
+1 −1
0.85 0.05
0 0.10
0 0.92
0.08 0
0 0.06
0.86 0.08
0.07 0
0 0.93

(15)
4. Broader reflections on compositionality and non-compositionality
A major contribution of this paper is its demonstration of a methodology by
which we might start to explore the debate about compositionality empirically.
One question that has not yet been satisfactorily answered to date concerns the
underlying cause of languages’ apparently non-compositional behaviour: does
language just violate Marginal Selectivity, or is it possible that some concep-
tual combinations might satisfy Marginal Selectivity and yet violate a Bell type
inequality? This paper has pointed to a systematic way in which this question
might be answered. While the experiments discussed in section 3 are not con-
clusive about Marginal Selectivity, they do point towards some compounds that
could perhaps be shown to satisfy this property with a large enough sample size.
If such an experimental scenario was then shown to violate a Bell-type inequal-
ity then we would have learned much about the cognitive processes underlying
language comprehension. More experimentation is required.
The importance of definitively answering such a question can be illustrated
with reference to Costello and Keane (2000), who classify non-compositional
conceptual combinations into three categories depending upon how their ap-
parent non-compositionality arises. Firstly, some combinations are deemed
non-compositional because of emergent properties, which generally arise from a
meaning which is based on a subset of atypical instances. The aforementioned
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PET FISH example is placed in this category. A second set of conceptual com-
binations are classified non-compositional due to the manner in which the senses
of the combining words are extended beyond their standard usage, to refer to
instances outside the categories usually named by those words. Finally, some
conceptual combinations are classified as non-compositional because they make
use of cognitive processes such as metaphor, analogy or metonymy in their inter-
pretation. Costello and Keane (2000) use the conceptual combination SHOVEL
BIRD to illustrate all three categories:
1. A “shovel bird” could be a bird with a flat beak for digging up food
2. A “shovel bird” could be a bird that comes to eat worms when you dig in
the garden
3. A “shovel bird” could be a plane that scoops up water from lakes to dump
on fires
4. A “shovel bird” could be a company logo stamped on the handle of a
shovel
5. A “shovel bird” could be someone allowed out of jail (free as a bird) as
long as he works on a road crew.
They argue that (1) and (2) are examples of the first category because a bird
with a flat beak is atypical, whereas (3) illustrates the second category be-
cause it extends the sense of both SHOVEL and BIRD beyond their normal
usage. Finally (4) and (5) are put forward as examples of third category
due to their metaphoric nature. Costello and Keane (2000) detail how their
constraint-based theory of conceptual combination specifically relates to each
of these categories. The framework presented in this paper, however, mod-
els the non-compositionality of SHOVEL BIRD irrespective of the category of
non-compositionality involved. For example, SHOVEL has the sense of being a
tool, or being shaped like a shovel. The concept BIRD has three senses in the
preceding example: relating to an animal, a plane, and a prisoner. Thus, the
concept BIRD could be modelled as consisting of both a dominant ANIMAL
(A1) and a subordinate PLANE (A2) sense. In this more general scenario, the
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broad class of Bell-type inequalities (including the CHSH, CH and Fine variants
discussed in this paper) could be applied to test for the non-compositionality
of each possible interpretation resulting from a combination of SHOVEL with
BIRD.
In addition, there is no requirement in the presented analytical framework
that the concepts be explicit homographs, it can also be applied in a number of
other scenarios. For example, a weaker form of ambiguity, polysemy can also be
explored with this framework. A WordNet analysis of the noun-noun combina-
tions used in the compositional models explored by Mitchell and Lapata (2010)
reveals that the vast majority have more than one synset and hence more than
one shade of meaning, and thus that they are polysemous (as was the case for
the concept SHOVEL above). Similarly, ambiguity could also derive from the
relations that link two conceptual combinations and thus our framework could
allow for a clarification as to which word is acting as a head and which a modi-
fier in conceptual combinations. For example, the CARIN model assumes that
relations apply to the modifier, so in ADOLESCENT DOCTOR, an ambiguous
concept that is discussed by Gagne (2001), an ambiguity arises between the
competing relations in “doctor FOR adolescents” and “doctor IS adolescent”.
Both of these possibilities for the concept ADOLESCENT could be accessed
through priming, and then probabilistically represented with their correspond-
ing variables A1 or A2 (Gagne (2001) provides an experimental procedure
for priming relations). DOCTOR is also ambiguous because it is polysemous,
e.g., a medical doctor, or someone holding a PhD. Both of these possibilities
could be modelled by the variables B1 and B2. The analytical framework pre-
sented here could be applied to both of these scenarios, and thus the study
of (non-)compositionality in conceptual combinations which have already been
considered in the psychological literature. The joint distribution criterion (JDC)
proposed by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) provides an extension of the frame-
work presented here that could be put to sensible use in testing these more
general scenarios. This condition is decided by solving a linear programming
problem of the form MQ = P,Q ≥ 0. In the context of this article, the vector
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P would comprise the sixteen probabilities depicted in (2) and Q would repre-
sent the global joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012)
prove that if marginal selectivity does not hold, then there is no solution for Q.
If marginal selectivity holds and no distribution Q can be found, then the as-
sociated conceptual combination can be deemed non-compositional. The linear
programming approach is more general than the CHSH and Bell/CH inequali-
ties in that it applies to any number of random variables with any number of
possible values, and is a potentially rich area for consideration in future work.
In summary, this paper has proposed a framework for empirically testing the
dividing line between compositionality and non-compositionality, not an adju-
dication upon the ongoing debate about compositionality in conceptual repre-
sentation. One test that we provide is based on the violation of the Bell class
of inequalities, but this can only be considered surprising in a scenario where
the other test (Marginal Selectivity) is also satisfied. This is because, similarly
to the locality condition in Bell-type inequalities, Marginal Selectivity can be
understood as the underlying basis upon which a system could initially be as-
sumed to be separable in the first place. A major contribution of this paper is
a method capable of determining which of the two underlies non-compositional
behaviour. However, the determination of compositionality that this analysis
provides must take into account the priming conditions of the test, which em-
pirically simulate the context (e.g., the discourse context) of the interpretation.
As discussed by Kitto (2014), there is no result without a supplied context (in
this case the priming), and it is important that we capture this information.
It appears that historically George Boole considered the problem of the con-
straints involved when trying to construct a global distribution of three variables
from pairwise joint distributions (Pitowsky, 1994), however, Vorob’ev discov-
ered results constraining this approach, providing a set of results more general
to that of Fine’s theorem. Vorob’ev was ignored (Khrennikov, 2010), apparently
because his results pointed to the potential limits of standard probability theory,
which was gaining in popularity as it was developed by Kolmogorov. Thus, it
was quantum physics that became famous for demonstrating the impossibility
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of modelling entangled systems in a single probability space. In our opinion, this
is but a quirk of the past, and Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have independently
shown how such results can appear in cognitive psychology. The history just
sketched, together with the fact that the Bell-type inequalities are based solely
on conventional probability theory, opens the possibility to non-controversially
apply them outside of quantum physics (Aerts et al., 2000, 2014; Khrennikov,
2010; Bruza et al., 2009b).
5. Conclusions
This article departed from the assumption that conceptual combinations
may not exclusively exhibit compositional semantics. The very idea of a non-
compositional semantics has been resisted in the literature spanning cognitive
science, philosophy and linguistics, probably because the “principle of composi-
tionality” has had such a significant track record of success over a long period.
It is, however, precisely the assumption that semantics must necessarily be of
a compositional form that has been regularly questioned in a wide range of lit-
erature. Despite this state of confusion, few analytical approaches have been
proposed that are capable of demarcating the difference between the two forms
of behaviour. We have shown that it is possible to analyse the manner in which
the semantics of a given conceptual combination might be considered as com-
positional, or non-compositional. Indeed, it is perhaps timely to remind the
reader that we do not argue against compositional semantics per se. Rather, we
have tried in this article to shed light on the line at which it breaks down: We
believe that both compositional and non-compositional models will be necessary
in order to provide a full account of the semantics of language.
We modelled the semantics of concepts in terms of the different senses in
which a concept may be understood, where a given sense corresponds to the in-
terpretation attributed to a particular ambiguous concept. These senses have a
reliable intersubjective cognitive underpinning, as they were grounded in terms
of human word association norm data, which was used to predict the probabil-
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ity that a subject would attribute a particular sense to an ambiguous concept.
Utilising formal frameworks developed for analysing composite systems in quan-
tum theory, we presented two methods that allow the semantics of conceptual
combinations to be classified as “compositional” or “non-compositional”. This
classification differs from previous research in two ways. Firstly, composition-
ality is not graded, e.g., “weak” versus “strong” compositionality. Secondly,
the declaration of compositionality, or non-compositionality, is not an absolute
classification, but context sensitive. An empirical study of twenty-four novel
conceptual combinations illustrates how the classifications can be applied. Im-
portant corollaries are:
• Conceptual combinations violating marginal selectivity cannot be mod-
elled in a single probability space across the four variables modelling the
respective interpretations of the constituent concepts. Such conceptual
combinations are immediately “non-compositional”
• When marginal selectivity does hold, and the Bell-type inequalities are
not violated, then the semantics of the conceptual combination cannot
be modelled in a four way joint probability distribution, the variables of
which correspond to how the constituent concepts are being interpreted
in their respective dominant and subordinate senses. Such conceptual
combinations are “compositional”.
• When marginal selectivity does hold, and any of the Bell class of inequali-
ties are violated, then the semantics of the conceptual combination cannot
be modelled in a four way joint probability distribution. Such conceptual
combinations are “non-compositional”.
This result could have a marked impact in modelling cognitive phenomena more
generally, as these phenomena are frequently assumed to be compositional, and
no thought is given as to whether the phenomenon can be modelled within a
given probability space that the modeller constructs in terms of random vari-
ables. It is simply assumed that it can. Experiments from quantum physics
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show that for entangled systems no such model exists.
Finally, this article adds further weight to the claim that quantum theory is
a fruitful source of new theoretical insights and tools for modelling conceptual
semantics, as it has already done in other areas of cognition (Bruza et al., 2009a;
Aerts, 2009; Khrennikov, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Busemeyer and Bruza,
2012; Nelson et al., 2013; Blutner et al., 2013; Aerts et al., 2013).
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Appendix A. Possible Confounding Factors
A number of factors beyond marginal selectivity must be considered when
constructing experiments such as the ones introduced here. Are the primes
working as intended? How familiar are the compound conceptual combinations?
Could response time be taken as an indicator that the experimental design is
inappropriate? Factors such as these could influence the frequency of resulting
interpretations at a statistical level, and so must be carefully controlled. In
this appendix we show that a number of possible confounding factors have been
taken into account in this work, demonstrating that the priming used in these
experiments can be considered effective, despite the complexity of the protocol.
Appendix A.1. Frequency of Interpretations
The frequency of interpretations was analysed using Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests. The results are summarised in table A.4.
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Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 6.88 4.72
Same Order 3.20 2.32
Reverse Order 3.67 2.40
Figure A.4: Mean Number of Interpretations (Consistent or Inconsistent) with the Primes by
Prime Order (Overall, Same Prime Order, Reverse Prime Order)
As expected, overall participants gave significantly more interpretations that
were consistent with the primes (mean = 6.88), than inconsistent with the
primes (mean = 4.72), z = 4.06, p < .0001. This provides evidence that the
primes were affecting the interpretations given in the correct direction. To
analyse whether the order in which the primes were shown had an effect on
number of interpretations, we divided the consistent and inconsistent interpre-
tations into whether the priming words were in the same order or reverse order
to that of the compound. No significant differences were found. Furthermore,
the priming effect was still present within the priming order conditions. That
is, when prime order was the same, participants gave significantly more con-
sistent interpretations (mean = 3.20) than inconsistent interpretations (mean
= 2.32), z = 2.77, p = .006. Likewise, when prime order was reversed, partic-
ipants again gave significantly more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.67)
than inconsistent interpretations (mean = 2.40), z = 3.34, p = .001. Overall,
these results provide strong evidence that the priming was effective, and that it
is independent of priming order.
Appendix A.2. Response time
The speed of producing an interpretation was analysed according to whether
it was consistent or inconsistent with regards to the priming words, and whether
this was affected by prime order. It was expected that if the priming was effective
then interpretations that were inconsistent with the primes would be produced
slower than interpretations that were consistent with the primes. As seen in
table A.5, the mean response times were in the correct direction. Since a number
of participants did not give responses for all of the categories, the number of
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Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 3095.51 3288.99
Same Order 3066.47 3273.25
Reverse Order 3083.10 3299.40
(a)
Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 3138.76 3352.58
Same Order 3155.78 3329.85
Reverse Order 3098.23 3274.58
(b)
Figure A.5: Mean Response Time for Producing Interpretations (Consistent or Inconsistent)
with the Primes by Prime Order (Overall, Same Prime Order, Reverse Prime Order)(a) Mean
response times (ms) before analysis (N = 65) (b) Mean response times (ms) used in ANOVA
(N = 51)
participants in the analysis was 51. The analysis showed no main effect of
Interpretation (p = 0.297), Prime Order (p = 0.718), nor an Interpretation x
Prime Order interaction (p = 0.994). One likely reason for the non-significant
effects is the large variance in response times (range = 369ms to 10035 ms), thus
making it difficult for the mean differences to reach significance. For this reason
we feel that the frequency scores are more reliable measures, and importantly
these showed significant effects of priming.
Appendix A.3. Compound familiarity
One concern is that the evidence for non-compositionality found in this study
may be a function of familiarity. In particular, highly familiar compounds would
be expected to require less combinatorial processing as the combined meaning
may simply be retrieved from long term memory. We consider this possibility
unlikely due to the experimental procedure followed. The fact that both words
are ambiguous allows the priming procedure to shift participants into consider-
ing new combined meanings. For instance, while most participants (86%) inter-
preted SPRING PLANT as “a plant that grows in spring”, when primed with
‘coil’ and ‘leaf’, 3% of participants gave the interpretation “a springy plant”.
Thus these participants have arguably been influenced by priming towards gen-
erating a new meaning, even though a highly common meaning already exists.
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In fact, as previously mentioned for spring plant and other compounds the
findings of non-compositionality seem to depend upon participants producing
novel meanings for the compounds. This finding goes against the hypothesis
that non-compositionality is driven entirely by the retrieval of pre-stored mean-
ings. To test whether familiarity is associated with non-compositionality, we
obtained hit rates for each compound by typing each into google with quotes.
This measure of familiarity has been used in previous studies, e.g., Ramm and
Halford (2012); Wisniewski and Murphy (2005). It was found that the nov-
elty of compounds based upon hit rates ranged from 144 (STAG YARN) to
9,460,000 (BATTERY CHARGE). To reduce the large variance obtained in the
hit rates we transformed the scores into logs of ten. If familiarity is driving the
non-compositionality results it would be expected that CHSH scores would be
positively correlated with google hit rates. To test this we calculated a Pearson
R correlation. This showed a weak positive correlation between the two vari-
ables, though this was non-significant, r = 0.21, p = .337. Thus we did not find
evidence for the hypothesis that the non-compositionality of compounds in this
study is driven by familiarity. However, as there were only 24 compounds under
study, we acknowledge that there may not have been enough power to derive a
significant correlation.
More generally, the primes are an experimentally pragmatic means to ma-
nipulate the manner in which context affects the interpretation applied to con-
ceptual combinations, and so they need only influence the interpretation, not
determine it. The violations that do occur arise only with respect to the reported
priming conditions, and may not occur in a different experimental context.
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